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Context:  In high  income  countries  the  costs  of  delivering  high  quality  equitable  care  are  outstripping
present  budgets.  This  article  reviews  the  affordability  of  cancer  care  in  these  countries  with  particular
reference  to the  United  Kingdom  (U.K.).  The  question  remains  as to whether  patients  should  contribute
to  their  cancer  treatment  through  the  introduction  of  user  charges,  and  whether  such payments  can  be
assimilated  without  undermining  efﬁciency  and  equity  of  health  care  access.
Methods: In our  review  we analyse  the  drivers  of  increased  cancer  care  utilisation,  the  current  policies
designed  to control  rising  costs,  and  the  potential  impact  of  introducing  patient  user  charges.  The article
also  explores  whether  our  understanding  of  behavioural  economics  could  be  used to  create  “nudge”
policies  that drive  rational  health  care  consumption.
Findings: The  costs  of cancer  care  in  the U.K.  are  increasing  at an  unprecedented  rate,  driven  by demo-
graphic  changes,  innovation  (radiotherapy,  drugs  and  imaging)  and  consumerism  within  health  care.
Budgets  are  tightly  constrained  and  health  technology  assessments  designed  to  ensure  coverage  of high
value  interventions  have  come  under  signiﬁcant  public  and  political  scrutiny.  User  charges  potentially
provide  a framework  to  “nudge”  patients  from  low  value  care  of  limited  effectiveness  towards  high  value
cost  effective  treatment,  thereby  increasing  overall  efﬁciency.  However  supply  side controls  are  equally
relevant  with  greater  focus  on physician  test  ordering,  and  improving  the quality  of  doctor–patient
communication,  especially  when  discussing  treatment  options  towards  the  end  of  life.
Conclusions: Fiscal  sustainability  of health  care  ﬁnancing  remains  a key  public  policy  concern.  Attempts
at  ensuring  coverage  of cost  effective  treatments  have  been  continuously  challenged  and  without  new
policies,  sustainability  trade-offs  may  be  necessary  with  potential  rationing  of high  value treatments.  User
charges  provide  a potential  means  of sustaining  spending  proportional  to the  projected  rise  in number
of  cancer  cases,  whilst  embracing  technological  innovations  which  could  potentially  improve  outcomes.
©  2013  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  
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ntroduction
In the last ﬁscal (2011/12) year the United Kingdom’s (U.K.)
epartment of Health budget stood at £106.66 billion, an increase
ompared to 2010/11 (£105.45 billion), although in real terms this
as a budget cut of 1.2%. Additional pressure on NHS (National
ealth Service) budgets has been placed by the “Nicholson chal-
enge” which is seeking efﬁciency savings of more than £20 billion
y 2015 in order to meet projected patient demand [1]. Of total
HS spend, cancer care accounted for £5.81 billion, equating to 5.6%
f total NHS budget [2]. In comparison France and Sweden spend
pproximately 10% and 7%, respectively, of their total healthcare
pend on cancer care [3]. Political prioritisation of cancer in the
.K. has been matched with a 75% increase in cancer care spending
etween 2003/04 and 2009/10 (although funding for cancer was
educed comparatively in 2010/11). Indeed only social care and
iabetes have received a greater percentage increase in funding
ver this time period. As it stands then the cancer community in
he U.K. should be in a good position. Major public policy changes,
ncluding a National Cancer Plan have been coupled to real spending
ncreases.
However, there is a real concern regarding the rising costs of
elivering high quality cancer care in the U.K. as well as many other
igh income countries. In high income countries the public policy
onsensus is that costs of delivering high quality equitable care are
utstripping the national budgets [4]. In the U.S.A., the total spend-
ng on cancer care has grown from $27 billion in 1990 to $124 billion
n 2010, with a further projected rise in spending to $157 billion,
aking into account inﬂation, by 2020 [5,6]. Given the ﬁscal con-
traints in the NHS, the affordability of cancer care over the next
wo decades needs to be urgently addressed given that increases in
he costs of cancer care are likely to supersede overall health care
nﬂation [4]. This is being driven by a number of factors; techno-
ogical innovation, rising costs of hospital care, and an increase in
he proportion of individuals susceptible to malignancy as a result
f demographic transitions; essentially a rapidly ageing population
7]. Within the U.K. there is currently an ongoing public and polit-
cal debate regarding the escalating costs of cancer treatment and
ow best this should be funded [8,9].
A particularly sensitive public policy issue is whether patients
hould contribute to their cancer treatment, through the intro-
uction of user charges or copayments. Ultimately the aim would
e to sustain spending proportional to the projected rise in num-
er of cancer cases, whilst embracing technological innovations
hich could potentially improve disease outcomes. This discussion
s important, as all stakeholders would want to avoid alternative
ustainability trade-offs that may  result in the rationing of high
alue and cost effective care.
In our analysis of the U.K.’s public policy regarding afford-
ble cancer care we examine the drivers of increased cancer care
tilisation and costs in the U.K., the policies designed to control
ising costs, and the impact that the introduction of patient user
harges could have on cancer care. The debate can be widened
o encompass other high income countries within Europe which
re experiencing very similar demographic transitions. Whether
perating a tax based or social health insurance system of health
are ﬁnancing, these countries are under increasing pressure
o achieve ﬁscal sustainability, and despite user charges being
tilised more readily across Europe, cancer care is frequently . . . .  .  . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . . . .  .  .  . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  . . . . .  37
excluded from such charges. However in reality can we  afford to do
so?
The demographic transition
Stuart  Jay Olshansky has described our modern era as the “age of
delayed chronic diseases” with declines in mortality at older ages
responsible for increases in life expectancy and population growth
[7]. As a result the U.K. population size is expected to increase from
62 million to 71 million by 2030, with the proportion of individuals
aged over 65 set to rise from its current level of 17–25% by 2030
(Eurostat 2013). Horiuchi has postulated that we are approaching
the “high technology” era where cancer, will become the dominant
cause of mortality in the developed world [10]. In the U.S., cancer
is now the leading cause of death in those under 85 years, a pat-
tern which is emerging in the U.K., where at present circulatory
diseases remain the predominant cause of mortality but which are
on a downward trajectory with cancer soon to take the top spot
[11].
In 1975 the projected lifetime cancer risk for men in the U.K.
was 25% but this ﬁgure has risen to an estimated 45% in 2012 [12].
Whilst the age standardised incidence for all cancers combined is
expected to decrease by 1% leading up to 2030, the prevalence is
projected to increase as a result of the demographic transition.
The number of cancers in men  is expected to increase by 55%,
from 149,169 to 231,026 between 2007 and 2030, and by 35%
from 148,716 to 200,929 for women. Prostate, breast, lung and
colorectal cancer are predicted to continue to be the commonest
tumour types, however increases are expected for rarer sites such
as melanoma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and oropharyngeal cancer
[13,14]. Furthermore the burden of malignancy disproportionately
effects older persons, with 69% of cancers in men  and 62% in women
diagnosed in those aged over 65 in 2011 [14].
Innovation
There have been signiﬁcant technological developments in can-
cer care which have sought to facilitate earlier diagnosis, aid
treatment selection and improve disease control and survival out-
comes. However, recent innovations in imaging, radiation therapy
and drug development have come at a considerable cost to already
stretched health care budgets [4].
Imaging
Between 1996 and 2006 the imaging costs associated with U.K.
cancer care increased from 5.1% to 10.3% of the total budget [4].
Diagnostic accuracy associated with imaging techniques such as
computerised tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) has improved. However, it is the introduction of hybrid
scanners such as positron emission tomography with CT imaging
(PET-CT) that have increased the sophistication of treatment selec-
tion [15]. These technologies combine anatomical and molecular
imaging techniques to achieve more accurate and early diagnosis
of new and recurrent disease, provide detailed staging informa-
tion, and assess treatment response [16]. For example in Hodgkin’s
lymphoma PET-CT is used to detect biological tumour response to
a therapeutic intervention, guiding subsequent treatment choice
[17].
nal of 
a
t
p
o
n
a
i
a
R
d
a
a
a
s
a
(
d
b
i
n
c
2
a
r
g
l
l
s
i
w
m
r
i
c
t
U
r
4
g
t
p
e
t
a
t
u
d
3
m
H
t
m
[
r
a
I
w
c
wA. Aggarwal, R. Sullivan / Jour
These beneﬁts come at signiﬁcant capital and operational costs
nd evidence based guidelines have therefore attempted to priori-
ise their utility in particular disease sites. However these public
olicy cost containment approaches always lag behind the devel-
pment of increasingly sophisticated imaging modalities and their
ovel uses in deﬁning treatment selection, duration, and treatment
daptation [18]. Evidence suggests that technological innovation in
maging is a major factor in the rapid inﬂation of cancer care costs,
nd this does not appear to be slowing [19].
adiation technology
Radiotherapy is required by 60% of patients with cancer, and is
irectly involved in the management of 40% of those patients who
re cured [20,21]. Currently radiotherapy technology expenditure
bsorbs about 5% of the total U.K. cancer budget [22]. Taking into
ccount all costs across the life cycle of the resource, it is, broadly
peaking more cost effective than surgery and chemotherapy with
 21 fraction course of radical radiotherapy costing 3239 euro
±566) [23]. However, the U.K. is in a paradoxical situation where
elivering affordable radiotherapy over the next twenty years is
eing compromised by both current under-capacity and under-
nvestment in ‘standard’ radiotherapy and also over-penetration of
ewer radiotherapy technologies that have far greater associated
osts [24].
Addressing the shortfall in radiotherapy capacity in the U.K. in
007, the National Radiotherapy Advisory Group report (NRAG) set
 series of targets based on projected radiotherapy demand and
ecommended a 63% increase in current capacity [25]. An interim
oal of 40,000 radiotherapy attendances per million of the popu-
ation (pmp) by 2010 (now considered an underestimate based on
atest projections) was set. However, audit results from 2010/11
how that there were only 33,000 attendances pmp. Despite capital
nvestment and an overall 13% increase in activity over 6 years, this
as still insufﬁcient to meet current demand. By 2016 the require-
ent will be 55,000 attendances pmp, requiring an extra 147
adiotherapy machines [26]. Given the current ﬁnancial restrictions
n place this is unlikely to be achieved as each machine typically
osts £1.4 million, a cost which excludes the necessary stafﬁng,
raining, software and quality assurance outlay. Furthermore the
.K. government in its 2010 spending review recommended a 17%
eduction in capital investment from 5.1 billion in 2010–2011 to
.6 billion in 2014–2015 [27].
The U.K. is also lagging behind in well-established second
eneration radiotherapy technologies. Advances in radiotherapy
echnology aim to enhance the therapeutic ratio by improving the
recision of radiation delivery to the target area. This allows dose
scalation to the primary tumour with the aim of better local
umour control whilst achieving a concomitant reduction in radi-
tion dose to normal tissues, reducing the risk of acute and long
erm morbidity. Intensity modulated radiotherapy (IMRT) mod-
lates the treatment beam to achieve highly conformal radiation
ose distributions and steep dose gradients compared to standard
D conformal radiotherapy [28]. It is recommended in the treat-
ent of a number of disease sites including head and neck cancers.
owever, in the U.K. demand is not being met  at present with
he most recent audit demonstrating that only 25% of the recom-
ended number of IMRT treatments are being delivered nationally
26].
Whilst the U.K. lags behind in delivering affordable standard
adiotherapy technologies it is also seeing an inﬂux of new radi-
tion technologies at an unprecedented rate. Next generation
MRT has been further reﬁned to enable radiation beam shaping
hile the beam is moving in a circle around the target. Commer-
ially these machines go under the name of RapidArc® or VMAT®
hen using a standard linear accelerator or as Tomotherapy®Cancer Policy 2 (2014) 31–39 33
when using a dedicated linear accelerator only treating with
arcs.
Stereotactic body radiotherapy (SBRT) represents a further
advance and refers to the “precise irradiation of an image-deﬁned
extra-cranial lesion using a high radiation dose in a small number
of fractions.” This technique requires complex methods of immo-
bilisation and target localisation and as a result is more resource
intensive than conventional 3D conformal radiotherapy in terms
of equipment and planning [29,30]. It is not known whether SBRT
offers superior outcomes in terms of long term local control and
quality of life for all potential indications [31,32]. It does, though,
come with a signiﬁcant increase in price both in capital and rev-
enue terms. Recent estimates value a new cyberknife machine at
approximately £2.5 million compared to £1.4 million for a new
linear accelerator. These ﬁgures do not take into account the addi-
tional software, personnel costs and quality assurance associated
with SBRT [33].
Proton  beam therapy has also been making inroads into the
NHS. It is the treatment modality of choice for speciﬁed adult
(e.g. skull base chordoma), and paediatric tumours (e.g. cranio-
pharyngioma, rhabdomyosarcoma). Principally it aims to reduce
morbidity from side effects and increase cure rates, which could
not be achieved with conventional RT techniques without undue
toxicity [34]. However the majority of the evidence is based on
theoretical models and small selected case series due to the difﬁ-
culties in conducting large randomised control trials for radiation
technologies [24,35]
There  are plans to put in place two proton beam radiation ther-
apy units, the ﬁrst of which is likely to be operational by 2017.
The expected total cost is in the region of £250 million (equip-
ment alone costs £60–80 million) with a capacity to treat 1100
patients a year at both sites at a total cost of £37 million per
annum. Currently the NHS commissioning group is projected to
spend £30 million in 2014–15 to send 400 patients abroad for
treatment [36].
The  requirement to embrace new radiation technologies yet
build on current capacity levels to meet unmet need places consid-
erable strain on the ﬁnancial resources available. Unless efﬁciency
gains are achieved the NHS will not be able to sustain and increase
the necessary provision of radiotherapy let alone integrate tech-
nological advances which could improve outcomes further. Of all
the new technologies, the case of radiotherapy demonstrates the
paradox of public policy towards affordable cancer care. A failure
to deliver basic service needs, yet willingness to ‘over-spend’ on
technologies which have not been demonstrated to be cost effec-
tive. How much of this is fuelled by the desire to compete with other
cancer centres since the advent of patient choice [37] in order to
attract new patients and increase their market share remains as yet
unknown.
Cancer drugs
Cancer drugs represent a rising proportion of the cancer care
budget [38]. Between 2000 and 2009, 23 new drugs were brought
to market for use in cancer patients. Targeted drugs such as tyrosine
kinase inhibitors and monoclonal antibodies dominate the portfolio
of cancer drugs entering the market (only one cytotoxic agent was
launched between 2005 and 2009) [39]. These drugs target sub-
populations that possess speciﬁc genetic or proteomic alterations
which are implicated in cancer pathogenesis. The costs associated
with these “blockbuster” drugs are increasing dramatically. The
cost of an average course of non-hormonal systemic therapy in the
U.K. has increased from 34% of per capita GDP between 1995 and
1999 to 67% per capita GDP in 2005–2009 [39].
However, it should not be forgotten that molecular targeted
agents such as imatinib [40], rituximab [41] and trastuzumab [42]
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ave either improved cure rates or extended survival in certain
umours where previous therapeutic options were limited. Addi-
ionally, pharmaceutical companies do face signiﬁcant research and
evelopment costs when bringing an anticancer agent to market
or increasingly limited populations, although it is highly doubtful
hether the costs of new drug development are as high as claimed
in the region of 1–2 billion US dollars) [43,44]. More sober and
ispassionate calculations suggest a half or even a third of this [45].
Rising administrative costs and bureaucracy of trial procedure
ave also discouraged academic (investigator initiated) clinical
esearch, resulting in most trials being conducted by for-proﬁt
harmaceutical companies [46]. This has resulted in the launch
f several high priced drugs of questionable efﬁcacy to recoup
uch inﬂated trial costs [47]. However, in many cases the higher
rices set for new cancer medicines were not accompanied by
roportional improvements in health [48]. In the U.S. total health
xpenditures for cancer care increased 9% from 2001 to 2004,
espite the composite indicator for quality of cancer care during
his period only increasing by 3.6% [49].
he role of health technology assessments
Attempts to control the provision of drugs not deemed cost
ffective by health technology assessment (HTA) agencies such as
he U.K.’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
ave been met  with widespread public and professional discon-
ent [50,51]. NICE was designed to ensure that all patients received
he most effective treatment (by eliminating postcode prescribing),
asing their value judgements on a thorough period of consultation
nd health economic impact modelling [52]. They provide valuable
n-depth analysis of new drugs and technologies focusing on both
hort and long term outcomes of treatment and direct patient bene-
ts. They also highlight ﬂaws in trial design and misrepresentation
f positive results. For example, erlotinib when administered to
ancreatic cancer patients demonstrated a median survival bene-
t of 0.33 months when combined with gemcitabine, the current
tandard treatment, with increased risk of toxicities [53]. There was
n incremental cost per QALY of over a $100,000. Based on this evi-
ence this drug was not approved by NICE although it had received
arketing approval by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
nd European Medicines Agency (EMA).
A value threshold of £30,000 per QALY gained was  set by NICE
hen making coverage decisions for treatments. The advantage
f the cost per QALY was its universality when making decisions
egarding the whole spectrum of health care interventions across
ll specialities. However, denial of treatment on the basis of an
bstract notion of life’s value does not come without its ethical
ilemmas.
These difﬁculties are exacerbated when the same drugs that
ave been refused in the U.K. are widely available in the U.S. and
urope. Between 2004 and 2008, 46 anticancer drugs were granted
 European license following FDA approval. NICE made recommen-
ations for 18 (39%) of these drugs to be freely available on the NHS
ith 11 (24%) still awaiting approval. In contrast all of these drugs
ere covered by the three main insurance providers in the U.S.
54,55].
However a comparison of coverage policies for expensive can-
er drugs between the U.K. and U.S. demonstrates that despite these
ndings, inequities in access may  be particularly acute in the U.S.
urrently all expensive cancer drugs undergo a rigorous health
echnology assessment in the U.K. prior to determining universal
overage. However, in the U.S. access may  be entirely contingent
n an individual’s health insurance coverage policy and ability to
ay with few patients having free access to expensive cancer drugs
hen needed. This creates inequities and exacerbates the risk ofCancer Policy 2 (2014) 31–39
ﬁnancial hardship or prevents patients receiving these drugs all
together [56]. This lack of transparency and consistency, calls into
question the fairness of coverage and cost sharing decisions in the
U.S. despite the rhetoric suggesting that in fact access to high cost
drugs is easier than in the U.K [57].
Public disapproval of NICE decisions has caused considerable
political consternation. There have been a series of legal chal-
lenges resulting in the approval of both trastuzumab and imatinib
which were both above the £30,000 QALY threshold [58]. Follow-
ing approval of sunitinib, NICE reviewed its policy for end of life
drugs, speciﬁcally the value placed on gains in survival and qual-
ity of life for incurable conditions where there remains a paucity of
reasonable alternatives [59]. Other drugs have since been approved,
for example vemurafenib which has been authorised for patients
with BRAF V600 mutation positive malignant melanoma and is
estimated to cost £1750 per week prior to any discounting [60].
A recent review estimated that between 2009 and 2011 the addi-
tional cost to the NHS of providing new interventions under the
end of life criteria was  549 million pounds per annum [61].
The  government has attempted to improve access further by
initiating the Cancer Drugs Fund. This is a £200 million ring fenced
fund that was  set up to provide access to cancer drugs that were not
deemed cost effective by NICE. This will ofﬁcially ﬁnish in January
2014 [62]. However, critics have argued that such a fund, which
is administered by oncologists, creates an inconsistent and unfair
model of resource allocation and that the fund represents a diver-
sion from the fair allocation of NHS resources for maximum societal
beneﬁt [63].
Value  based pricing (VBP) is expected to come into effect in
January 2014 in which NICE will no longer make explicit decisions
regarding funding but instead provide HTAs for new drugs. VBP rep-
resents society’s maximal willingness to pay for an intervention
through a public healthcare system following a rigorous assess-
ment of the cost effectiveness of other products. It aims to maintain
equity with the payer driving utilisation through evidence based
guidelines [64]. Drugs should be innovative, meet unmet needs, and
demonstrate tangible clinical beneﬁts. All laudable aims but as it
stands VBP in the U.K. lacks any form of comparative or quantitative
framing for the purposes of developing rigorous public policy.
In  a recent survey of societal preferences for NHS funding,
respondents agreed with the premise of value based pricing, but the
majority did not believe that extra value should be placed for spe-
ciﬁc groups such as children, cancer patients or those with reduced
life expectancy [65]. A further study also found that the majority of
cancer patients and the general public did not believe that the NHS
should fund drugs that have not been approved by NICE [66].
UK  public policy and the tax payer
The U.K. provides a uniform package of health beneﬁts irre-
spective of income. However, the most cursory examination of
the cost trajectory of cancer health technologies means that new
approaches to paying for cancer care need to be found. The NHS
has attempted to ration interventions through supply side controls,
providing those that are deemed most cost effective following inde-
pendent evaluation. As it stands it appears that such trade-offs are
still politically unpalatable. Cancer is too personal and emotive for
the public to accept decisions on rationing. Furthermore the num-
bers of cancer cases are expected to increase, with no concomitant
rise in the budget expected.
One  option would be to raise general taxation. However, recent
increases in taxation for the highest earners have been gained little
political traction [67]. Furthermore any increase in taxation will
have a number of competing calls on these funds (e.g. education
or transport) and there is no guarantee that increased tax revenue
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ill ultimately lead to higher health expenditure, particularly on
ancer care.
Despite being a radical departure from current public policy
iscourse on affordable cancer care, user charges, already the sub-
ect of widespread debate [68,69], could provide the key to long
erm sustainability of high quality cancer care in the U.K. A copay-
ent is a fee levied either in the form of a (1) deductible (a ﬁxed
mount to be paid by patients in a given time period towards
ealth care, above which is reimbursed by the third party payer),
2) proportional copayment (a percentage of the total cost of the
ervice/product) or (3) ﬁxed copayment (ﬂat rate fee e.g. pharma-
eutical prescription charge).
ser charges – the debate
During  the 1960s and 70s there was considerable backlash
owards medical paternalism across the UK and most high-income
ountries. The shift to individuals to take responsibility for their
ealth needs and decision making marked, so it was  assumed, a
ew responsibility for health, rooted in the individual [70].
However,  there is evidence that patients are reluctant to take
esponsibility for their health care needs [71]. Missed appointments
r non-adherence with drugs represent a form of non-compliance
nd whilst several factors may  mitigate, it could conceivably point
o a lack of ownership of the issue [72]. This in part has been
acilitated by universal health care coverage in the U.K., whereby
atients are shielded from direct health care costs at the point of
ccess. There is no incentive to restrain consumption, leading to
otential overuse as consumers can use health care for as long as
here is perceived beneﬁt no matter how marginal or at what cost
73], essentially a form of moral hazard in healthcare systems. This
s not something that applies to patients alone but also to health
rofessionals, who within budgetary and fee for service payment
chemes may  not have the necessary incentives to achieve efﬁ-
iency gains and moderate resource utilisation [74].
Advocates of user charges believe it empowers patients to take
reater responsibility for their health, encouraging greater focus
n quality and cost of health care services [75,76]. Out of pocket
ayments are routine in the U.S., with individuals having to pay
art of the cost for a physician visit, hospitalisation or other service
.g. chemotherapy [77]. This is applicable to both Medicare and
rivately insured individuals, with payers and insurers increasing
heir cost sharing requirements [78].
In Europe copayments are also used in a variety of forms [79].
n France there is an escalating scale of proportional copayments
35%, 70% or 80%) depending on the medical beneﬁt of the drug
nd seriousness of the condition [80]. In the Netherlands patients
ay a deductible copayment for the ﬁrst 220 Euros of their health
are costs, after which all care is covered by the third party payer
76]. In the U.K. we have already adopted copayments for dental
nd optician services, as well as routine prescriptions, for which a
xed charge (£7.85) is applied. Currently prescription charges gen-
rate approximately 1% of the NHS budget in income [81]. Could
e therefore reasonably integrate a series of copayments for all
ealth care services? This would include routine clinic appoint-
ents, diagnostic and treatment interventions, and inpatient stays.
aturally any system would require exemptions to ensure that low
ncome groups and the most vulnerable (e.g. children, older people,
hose with certain medical conditions) are not disproportionately
ffected. Cancer patients, for example, receiving treatment directly
elated to their cancer or for conditions resulting from previous
reatment have been exempt from prescription charges since 2009
n the U.K. [82].
However, there remain numerous objections to user charges
n the grounds of inequity and inefﬁciency. Goldman et al. in aCancer Policy 2 (2014) 31–39 35
review  of copayments in the U.S. found that charging patients
for health care costs resulted in lower rates of compliance, and
more frequent discontinuation of treatment [83,84]. This has been
demonstrated for cancer screening uptake [77] and adherence to
aromatase inhibitors for breast cancer, especially amongst elderly
patients [85]. However the impact on health outcomes (quality of
life, survival) remains inconclusive.
The  RAND health insurance experiment conducted in the 1970s
and 1980s reviewed the impact of an escalating system of copay-
ments in the USA on health care utilisation. The study found that
individuals across all income groups who faced a user charge
reduced their health care usage, but there was  no discrimination
for high value (effective) or low value care (inappropriate or treat-
ments of marginal beneﬁt) [86].
Furthermore, the higher the level of cost sharing the greater
the reduction in health utilisation, with a more pronounced impact
on low income groups [87]. There is also concern of a “squeezed
balloon effect” whereby user charges for prescription drugs result
in an increase in the use of other services e.g. emergency care.
Possible causes include patients forgoing necessary treatment and
presenting in extremis to hospital services or patients preferring
to attend secondary care to avoid paying user charges [88]. One
study demonstrated an increased frequency of admissions (hospi-
tal care was  covered by insurance) for cancer patients required to
pay higher copayments [89]. The other concern is one of fairness.
Cancer patients and their families already experience signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial costs as a result of a cancer diagnosis, regardless of socio-
demographic group. Those who  are employed or have ﬁnancial
dependents are particularly affected by the potential loss of earning
and costs associated with accessing services [90].
The public policy issue is whether copayments can be
introduced which do not negatively impact on low-income groups
yet enhances efﬁciency of health care delivery and maintenance of
high quality care.
User  charges to raise revenue
One argument is that demand for cancer care is not price sensi-
tive and that moral hazard is not a factor as decisions regarding
diagnostic and treatment interventions are made by informed
physicians rather than uninformed patients [91]. Furthermore can-
cer is a potentially life threatening condition and patients would
be willing to receive (and potentially pay) for therapies even if
they are of marginal beneﬁt [92]. User charges in these circum-
stances are likely to generate revenue if applied to cancer care, as
the likelihood of patients refusing a recommended course of action
(particularly if low income individuals are protected with exemp-
tions) is small. Evidence for patients’ willingness to pay for cancer
treatment comes from a number of “Willingness to Pay” (WTP)
studies [93,94].
These  have demonstrated that cancer patients, even with
metastatic cancer, would be willing to pay for therapies that
provide tangible beneﬁts in terms of disease control e.g. survival
and quality of life. The amount patients are willing to pay, whilst
still less than the true cost, of the drug, increases in line with
superior outcomes. However, there were socio-demographic dif-
ferences, with elderly, and unemployed patients less willing to pay,
compared to patients who  had higher incomes, and higher levels
of educational attainment [95]. Few WTP  studies have been per-
formed in cancer care, and this is potentially an avenue for future
research particularly with the advent of value based pricing. How-
ever, by choosing those areas of medicine that are valued highly
by patients (e.g. cancer care, kidney disease, rheumatoid arthri-
tis) there may  be greater acceptance of user charges compared to
those interventions that do not provide improvements in length or
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uality of life. However it goes without saying that the reverse sce-
ario may  be preferred by patients, with a preference for charges to
e applied to none life saving care and exemptions from any costs
ssociated with life threatening illness, as practised in the French
ealthcare system [80].
ser  charges – to encourage rational health care
onsumption
When reviewing patient demand for cancer interventions it is
mportant to realise that it is not necessarily driven by rational rea-
oning on the basis of available evidence. Our understanding of
ehavioural economics has highlighted how our decision making
rocesses are prone to biases which may  cause “reasoning failure”
96]. Patients are often required to weigh up risks of survival, tox-
city and quality of life when making treatment decisions. They
ay struggle with probabilities, over-estimating their level of risk
f disease and the potential beneﬁts of treatment [97], resulting in
hoices that negatively impact on welfare [98]. Under these circum-
tances patients may  also be inﬂuenced by an array of emotions, for
xample fear and grief [99].
Studies of cancer patients have found that demands for partic-
lar treatments do not come from a neutral evaluation of risks and
eneﬁts but rather from a perception of hope even when faced with,
 high likelihood of major toxicity and low beneﬁt [100]. This is
articularly relevant when cancer patients assess end of life treat-
ents, where they have been shown to value hope and are willing
o gamble on an intervention [95]. Such ﬁndings are entirely in line
ith prospect theory where decisions made under conditions of
ains and losses are very different, and not subject to a state of
aximising personal utility [101].
Moral hazard may  also play an additional role in deﬁning the
atient’s perceived losses and gains associated with treatment. If a
atient is shielded from the costs of health care, they may  be more
menable to accessing health care of marginal beneﬁt. The question
hen is how these insights can be utilised to frame the user charges
olicy?
Libertarian Paternalism (LP) may  be one such approach. LP aims
o provide a framework where individuals make decisions which
eneﬁt themselves and society, whilst still maintaining a range of
vailable options [102]. In other words by changing the “choice
rchitecture” for decision making individuals can be “nudged” into
aking the right choices [103]. Can user charges therefore be used
o nudge patients into making decision that optimise health care
fﬁciency?
A system of value based user charges could redirect (“nudge”)
ndividuals from low value to more cost effective treatment options.
n France, for example, patients wishing to seek direct specialist
ccess rather than obtain referral from their general practitioner
re required to pay higher charges for each consultation (50% pro-
ortional copayment rather than 30%) [104]. A similar initiative
ould be considered for patients wishing to have therapeutic agents
onsidered to be of low value, particularly those treatments consid-
red in the last weeks of life. A substantial proportion of the total
ost of cancer care is delivered in the last few weeks or days of
ife with much of this care lacking evidence and achieving limited
eneﬁt in terms of survival or symptom control [105]. We  know
hat in this situation patients may  not make rational decisions,
nd copayments could redirect care to more cost effective options
uch as best supportive care. It also provides an opportunity for
atients to obtain information about treatment options and become
mpowered in the decision making process.
A similar strategy may  be considered for new radiation tech-
ologies where insufﬁcient data may  be available to justify
overage over and above standard conformal 3D therapy. TheCancer Policy 2 (2014) 31–39
NHS  in this circumstance would reimburse the costs of standard
evidence based therapy with patients paying additional costs of
alternative technologies if they so wish. There is evidence to sup-
port this approach. One study demonstrated that user charges made
patients more discerning and more likely to reconsider utilisation
of controversial services e.g. prostate cancer screening as opposed
to proven and recommended interventions such as breast cancer
screening [106].
There  are two  main caveats with this approach in framing pub-
lic policy. Firstly there is often considerable uncertainty regarding
the effectiveness of interventions. This is especially relevant for
radiation technologies where the pace of software and hardware
advances make performing RCTs difﬁcult [24]. Secondly the clin-
ical and cost effectiveness of an intervention can vary depending
on individual patient characteristics and therefore setting a system
of charges in view of this heterogeneity may  undermine efﬁciency
and fairness [88].
Drummond et al. [91], considered the use of optional copay-
ments in a value based pricing (VBP) system. Copayments would
provide an opportunity for individuals to purchase care that was
not deemed to deliver enough social value for the cost. VBP would
also aim to provide accurate information on the costs and effective-
ness of alternative treatment strategies set above the VBP cost. This
would allow patients to make more informed decisions regarding
their treatment choices but would still not restrict access to drugs
that society is willing to pay for.
A similar strategy has been outlined by Garratini et al. [76],
who proposed a reference based pricing arrangement, similar to
those adopted in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands.
Here groups of therapeutically equivalent drugs (both generic and
branded) are priced according to the lowest-priced drug in the
cluster or an average price for the whole cluster. Copayments are
required by patients for those drugs which are set at a price above
the listed reference price (RP). This has the effect of encouraging
pharmaceutical companies to drive down the cost of their drugs in
order to maintain market share [107].
In the case of cancer drugs, a “life gain threshold” is set for a given
cancer according to currently available therapies e.g. 6 months for
colorectal cancer [108]. New therapies are then compared with
standard therapies to determine the added beneﬁt in terms of life
gain. Drugs not considered to produce adequate life gain would
not be reimbursed and instead a charge would be applied to the
standard therapy price to create an “automatic reference price.”
The effect would be to restrict expenditure of third party payers on
drugs (or radiation technologies), particularly at the end of life that
provide marginal beneﬁt in terms of survival or quality of life, but
patients would still have access to these treatments.
In addition, raising the life gain threshold for reimbursement
would encourage pharmaceutical companies to focus on produc-
ing innovative drugs that provide signiﬁcant clinical outcomes,
whilst discouraging companies from setting high prices above the
agreed reference price. The cancer drugs fund in many respects has,
amongst many other structural problems, disincentivised pharma-
ceutical companies from reducing their prices or from releasing
drugs with only marginal beneﬁts.
However these systems are open to “gaming.” For example the
government could set the societal willingness to pay threshold at a
level, which would encourage copayments from the majority, off-
setting the costs to the NHS [91]. However this could result in low
income groups not accessing care. Likewise pharmaceutical com-
panies may  set prices for an effective drug well above the VBP, to
encourage copayments resulting once again in access issues to the
most vulnerable and deprived communities.
A further argument points to the absence of restrictions for those
drugs not considered to be of sufﬁcient value to be reimbursed, but
remain freely available for those who  can afford it. As a result this
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ould result in perceived inequity not necessarily in outcomes, but
n superior access on the basis of an ability to pay. This is a key
oncern with the current top-up system for cancer drugs in the
.K. [109].
nformation provision as a means of encouraging rational
ealth  care consumption
A  perceived beneﬁt of implementing a user charges pol-
cy is the concomitant information that is provided to patients
egarding the value of the treatment they are consuming. This
ould improve health service efﬁciency both in terms of clinical
utcomes and ﬁnancial costs by reducing utilisation of low value
are [110]. However, can we create a “nudge” public policy in can-
er that reduces information asymmetry and empowers patients
o take responsibility for their health, without introducing explicit
harges?
As an example a patient due to receive a course of radiotherapy
ould be sent a letter prior to attendance detailing the total cost
f delivering the treatment (e.g. staff time, clinic space, cost per
raction of radiotherapy). There would be particular reference to
he fact that non-attendance would result in a loss of this sum to the
HS. The patient would also be informed of current waiting times
or services and that missed appointments place strain on resources
nd could impact on their health and that of other patients. Another
ption would be to provide an invoice itemising the health care
ervices utilised by the individual with the added comment that
his had been paid by the NHS.
The inclusion of pricing information aims to provide insight into
he healthcare process and the costs (social and economic) asso-
iated with this, which studies have shown are undervalued by
atients [111]. It therefore acts to reset the so-called norms by pro-
iding a frame of reference for actual health care costs. This in effect
ould reposition the perceived value of health care with the aim
f reinforcing positive health behaviours i.e. “nudge” patients to
onsume healthcare more rationally [112,113]. These behavioural
echniques have been used to inﬂuence physicians’ test ordering
ehaviour. For example, there was a 31.1% cost reduction when
roviders were given information about the price of tests compared
o the controls who were not [114].
It could have a wider impact on other areas of health utilisation
adherence, consumption of low value care, unnecessary hospital
ttendances). As framed by self determination theory the mainte-
ance of choice and absence of coercive regulation strategies would
ncourage sustainable positive health behaviours [115]. By avoid-
ng explicit charges this strategy is likely to be widely accepted and
ould facilitate future implementation of user charges if individuals
re aware of the actual costs of their treatment [116]. However, it
s not certain whether individuals are motivated to act in the inter-
st of social welfare (so called knights [117]) when faced with the
rospect of a shortened life expectancy.
An important argument that also needs to be considered against
oral hazard is that decisions about appropriate treatment are
ade by informed doctors rather than patients [91]. One solution
ould be to focus on physician behaviour. Overutilisation of diag-
ostic investigations, therapeutic agents or even the frequency of
ollow up can all result in escalating cancer care costs. This can
ccur as a result of a poor knowledge on the evidence for inter-
entions, time pressures in the clinical setting, fear of withdrawing
ope or even medicolegal concerns [118]. Oncologists need to be
nformed and subsequently inform their patients of the real value
f cancer care as this is likely to directly affect health care consump-
ion [8]. However, this will require adequate physician training to
nsure appropriate choices are made that beneﬁt the patient and
ociety [119]. Patients have expressed a desire to be informed ofCancer Policy 2 (2014) 31–39 37
such decisions and their rationale. Good communication in these
circumstances is essential [120].
Conclusion
The public policy debate around co-payments as part of an
overall strategy to deliver affordable cancer care system is ﬁnely
balanced. The fact remains that the costs of cancer care in the
U.K. are increasing at an unprecedented rate, driven by demo-
graphic changes, innovation and consumerism within health care.
Budgets are tightly constrained and health technology assessments
designed to ensure that the NHS cover those interventions that
are of high value have come under signiﬁcant public and political
scrutiny. Evidence based medicine requires us to make explicit and
judicious decisions on the care that we provide and not just offer
therapy as a means of providing hope to individuals. We  also need
to balance the whole of society’s health care needs to ensure that
we use limited resources efﬁciently yet provide high quality evi-
dence based care. Could the introduction of user charges in cancer
care provide a means of sustaining the provision of high value ser-
vices in the future whilst overcoming issues of fairness and equity
in access for those in need?
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